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Reinauer: International Arbitration as a Hurdle for the Promotion of Labor

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AS A HURDLE FOR THE PROMOTION OF
LABOR STANDARDS: SETTLING DISPUTES OVER THE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT PROCESS

The Republican President, Donald J. Trump, and progressive
Democrats found some unlikely common ground when the President
signed an executive order withdrawing the United States from the TransPacific Partnership ("TPP").1 Democratic Senators Elizabeth Warren and
Bernie Sanders were avid opponents of the trade deal on the Senate floor,2
and Trump departed from his fellow Republican candidates in opposing
the TPP during the 2016 Republican primaries. 3 While the executive
order provided a potential area for compromise between the President and
Democrats, there remains uncertainty surrounding one of the TPP's most
controversial provisions, the Investor State Dispute Settlement ("ISDS").4
Some commentators suggest that it is too soon for a trade agreement
honeymoon and, while the withdrawal from the TPP served an important
step, it is unclear if President Trump has any hostility towards the ISDS.'
As uncertain the future of U.S. trade agreements is, the Trump presidency
has created a ripe atmosphere for the discussion of the use of the ISDS in
future trade negotiations.'
President Barack Obama pushed the TPP in his second term and
stated that the TPP accounted for many of the shortcomings faced by weak

1.

Megan Cassella & Brent Griffiths, Trump signs executive order to withdraw from Trans-

Pacific
trade
deal,
POLITICO
(Jan.
23,
2017,
12:06
PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/trump-withdraw-from-trans-pacific-trade-deal-234039.
2. Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Sen. Mass., Floor Speech on the Trans-PacificPartnership(Feb.
2,2016), http://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2016-2-2_Warren TPP.pdf; Bernie Sanders
Exposes the Truth about the TPP, C-SPAN (May 21, 2015), https://www.cspan.org/video/?c4538639/bernie-sanders-exposes-truth-tpp.
3. Everett Rosenfeld, Trans-PacificPartnership:GOP candidates split on deal, CNBC (Oct.
21, 2015, 12:55 PM) http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/21/trans-pacific-partnership-gop-candidatessplit-on-deal.html ("GOP front-runner Donald Trump is one such critic. Outspoken on what he says
are America's trade failings with Mexico and China, Trump has tweeted several direct critiques of
what the Obama administration negotiated.").
4.

(Jan.

Caroline Simson, Trump's TPPExit Doesn't ImplicateInvestor-StateArbitration,LAW360

25, 2017, 7:12

PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/884347/trump-s-tpp-exit-doesn-t-

implicate-investor-state-arbitration.

5.
6.

Id
Id.
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and unenforceable labor standards in previous trade deals.' The United
States Trade Representative at the time stated that the TPP contained "the
strongest protections for workers of any trade agreement in history." 8
However, some contended that this notion was only true "on paper."9
Among the three levels of enforcement contained in the TPP, the dispute
settlement process was considered to be the "teeth" of the TPP's
enforcement power.o This process, one that can settle trade disputes
between partnering states, has been criticized for only ensuring that labor
provisions are "enforceable" but stopping short of ensuring that labor
The promotion of labor
provisions "will actually be enforced.""
standards in the TPP was further undermined by the agreement's inclusion
of the ISDS, an international tribunal that allows foreign investors to bring
an action against its host state. 12 At least one investor has used the ISDS
to bring an action against a foreign government for the raising of labor
standards, because the change had affected the investor's market
expectations. 13 When one considers that international arbitration arising
under free trade agreements ("FTA") are far more likely to be brought by
a foreign investor than by a partnering state,' 4 it seems clear that concerns
over the effective enforcement of labor standards in light of the ISDS have
a great deal of validity.
The election of Donald Trump as President dramatically shifted the

7. Michael D. Shear, Obama Defends Trans-PacificDeal Against Strong Anti-Trade Tide,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/03/world/asia/obama-defends-transpacific-partnership-against-strong-anti-trade-tide.html?_r-0 ("'What we're doing is we're raising
standards for workers in those countries, which means it's harder for them to undercut labor standards
here in the United States,' the president said.").
8.

Vivian Dong, Enforcing Labor Standards Under The

Trans-Pacific Partnership,

ONLABOR (Feb. 29, 2016), https://onlabor.org/2016/02/29/enforcing-labor-standards-under-thetrans-pacific-partnership/.

9.
10.

Id
Martin L. Schmelkin, Labour: The Challenges of Implementation and Enforcement of the

TPP, LEXOLOGY (July 7, 2016), http://www.lexology.comlibrary/detail.aspx?g-e51flcd3-387a4ef5-ad3f-da0978524d41.
11. Id
12.
13.

See Dong, supra note 8.
Matthew Rimmer, Creative Destruction: The Trans-PacificPartnership,Jobs, and Labor

2014),
https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-partnership(May
27,
MEDIUM
Rights,
intellectual/creative-destruction-the-trans-pacific-partnership-jobs-and-labor-rights4681f3cc85a8#.wlarOglqw ("The investor-state dispute settlement case of Veolia Propretgv. Arab
Republic of Egypt is particularly disturbing. In this matter, a French multinational company has
launched a claim against Egypt over labor wage stabilization promises, as well as a terminated waste
contract.").

14. Paul Reichler, Partner, Chair, Int'l Litig. & Arbritration Dep't at Foley Hoag, LLP, Maurice
A. Deane School of Law Philip J. Shapiro Endowed International Visiting Scholar Lecture: Seeking
Justice throughInternationalLitigation (Oct. 25, 2016) (transcript on file with author).
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U.S. stance on trade. President Trump called the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") the "worst trade deal ever approved in this
country." 5 The three partnering countries, the United States, Canada and
Mexico, have shown willingness to renegotiate the trade deal. 16 The
current discussion of trade in the United States provides a ripe atmosphere
for change. While the atmosphere is ripe, it may not be the case that the
most ambitious proposals for reform will find success.17 Any change will
likely find push back. In turn, this note will look to move the status-quo
carefully to ensure that the smallest changes lead to the greatest effects.
Rather than propose a mechanism to make international labor rights more
enforceable, this note will look to lessen the threat the ISDS poses to the
diminishing of international labor standards.
This note will not seek to perfect the current system, but rather it will
seek to remove one of the many hurdles that Investor-State arbitration
poses to heightened labor standards in the wake of increasing
globalization. First, a historical overview of both international labor
standards and the evolution of international trade agreements ("ITAs")
should provide fruitful insight on past attempts to create enforceable labor
laws across borders. Second, an outline of the dispute settlement system's
emersion will limit the scope of discussion and provide a more practical
direction for improvement. Third, a discussion of the criticism directed
at Investor-State arbitration will allow for a more tailored solution.
Fourth, an evaluation of other proposed solutions will be made. Finally,
this note will look to provide modest solutions to one of the many
problems surrounding Investor-State arbitration. This note will propose a
review process for investors' claims against states, one that will lessen the
threat that the ISDS poses to international labor standards. Additionally,
this note will advocate for more specific exceptions for labor claims in
ITAs respective investor chapters.

15. The pitfalls of renegotiating NAFTA, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 11, 2017),
http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21716660-revision-north-american-trade-deal-will-notgive-donald-trump-what-he-wants.
16. Id. ("All three governments agree that it could be made to work better. 'Any agreement can

be improved,' said David MacNaughton, Canada's ambassador to the United States, the day after Mr.
Trump won the election.").
17.
Lucie Cerna, The Nature of Policy Change and Implementation: A Review of Different
Theoretical Approaches, ORG.
FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION
& DEV.
16
(2013),

https://www.oecd.org/edu/ceriffhe%20Nature%20of%2OPolicy%2OChange%20and%20Implement
ation.pdf.
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND TRADE
ITAs have long been criticized for their purported negative impact
on labor.1 8 It is often asserted that trade agreements have propelled a "race
to the bottom," one that incentivizes the movement ofjobs to the cheapest
labor markets that offer the least amount of protections for workers. 19
This note will not seek to prove or disprove the validity of these notions
and acknowledges that it is not easy to quantify or qualify the economic
impacts of ITAs. 20 Rather, it will assume, for the sake of argument, that
there is a sufficient amount of evidence to reasonably assume that past
trade agreements have had some negative impacts on workers in one place
or another. Further, this note will look to how the ISDS has and could
exacerbate this effect.
It could be said that advocates for stronger international labor
standards in the wake of trade agreements make two central arguments.21
First, they make a moral argument that the freedom of association and the
prohibition of forced labor are more than just labor standards and
ultimately protect human rights.2 2 The second argument concerns
economic self-interest rather than the health and welfare of poor
workers.23 It has been argued that countries with low labor standards
experience an increase in global market competitiveness against those
countries with stronger labor laws.24 This leads to two purported negative
impacts on labor, one domestic and one general. 2 5 Domestically, workers
18. John M. Culbertson, The Folly of Free Trade, HARV. Bus. REV. (Sept. 1986),
https://hbr.org/1986/09/the-folly-of-free-trade.
Ko-Yung Tung, Investor-StateDispute Settlement under the Trans-PacificPartnership,23
19.
CAL. INT'L L.J. 19, 21 (2015).
NAFTA's Impact on the U.S. Economy: What Are the Facts?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON
20.

(Sept. 6, 2016), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edularticle/naftas-impact-u-s-economy-facts/
("Twenty-three years later, scholars and policy makers often disagree about the impact that NAFTA
has had on economic growth and job generation in the U.S. That impact, they say, is not always easy
to disentangle from other economic, social and political factors that have influenced U.S. growth....
Trade specialist agree that it has proven difficult to separate the deal's direct effects on trade and
investment from other factors, including rapid improvements in technology, expanded trade with
other countries such as China and unrelated domestic developments in each of the countries.").
21.

See Gary Burtless, Workers' Rights: Labor standardsand global trade, BROOKINGS INST.

(Sept. 1, 2001), https://www.brookings.edularticles/workers-rights-labor-standards-and-globaltrade/.
22. Id. ("Foreign nations that wish to be granted free access to the world's biggest and richest
markets should be required to observe fundamental human values, including labor rights. In short, the
lure of market access to the United States and the European Union should be used to expand the
domain of human rights.").
23. Id.
24. Id.
25.

Ajit Singh & Ann Zammit, Labour Standards and the 'Race to the Bottom': Rethinking
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in countries with high standards may see less employment or lower wages
due to the increased competitiveness of developing countries. 26 And,
generally, the increased globalization will lead to a "competitive erosion"
of standards everywhere as countries attempt to maintain their
competitive advantage and lure.2 7
In regards to domestic effects in labor friendly states, there are four
areas of concern: wage growth, wage dispersion, de-industrialization, and
unemployment.2 8 Some have contended that competition with developing
countries will cause higher-wage countries to incur "cutbacks in
production, failures of companies, and losses of jobs," which will in turn
force "workers [to] accept lower wages and a reduced standard of living
to match the lower-wage foreign competition." 29 The general negative
impact on labor, which is in part built upon domestic effects, entails that
the "erosion of labor standards everywhere" is a result of a "race-to-thebottom."o The notion assumes that multinational companies invest in
countries with subpar regulatory frameworks in order to undercut the
standards of their competitors. 31 The potential negative effects stemming
from increased globalization and trade were not unexpected.3 2 Thus, there
is a long history of attempts to homogenize labor standards across
borders.3 3
Part I of this note will provide a brief outline of the evolution of labor
standards in light of growing international trade. Section A will point to
early awareness of the potential impacts globalization would have on
labor. It will describe the manner in which the World Wars led to massive
shifts in the way sovereign states interact, and it will address the modern

Globalization and Workers' Rights from Development and Solidaristic Perspectives, 20 OXFORD

REV. OF ECON. POL'Y 85, 89-90 (2004).
26. Id at 89 ("It will be appreciated that the basic apprehension here is about competition with
low-wage countries, rather than those simply with low labour standards. In practical terms, low wages

and low standards generally go together.").
27. Id.
28. Id. at 90.
29. Culbertson, supranote 18.
30. Singh & Zammit, supra note 25, at 89.
31.

William W. Olney, A Race to the Bottom? Employment Protection and Foreign Direct

Investment, 91 J. INT'L ECON. 191 (2013) ("[T]he race to the bottom hypothesis hinges on two
important predictions. First, multinational enterprises (MNE) choose to invest in countries with less
restrictive standards. Second, foreign countries competitively undercut each other's standards in order
to attract foreign direct investment (FDI).").

32.

Id.

33. See Drusilla K. Brown, InternationalLabor Standards in the World Trade Organization
and the International Labor Organization, 82 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, no. 4, 105, 105

(July/August 2000), https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publications/review/00/07/0007db.pdf
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push for international labor standards.3 4 Section B will look at a number
of U.S. trade agreements. 35 After a description of early U.S. trade
agreements, this note will tailor its focus to two modern examples,
NAFTA and the TPP. Part I of this note will show that the United States
and much of the international community have continuously attempted to
account for labor in the promotion of international trade and that much of
that effort has been deemed inadequate.
A. The Pushfor InternationalLabor Standards
1. Post-World War I
The need for workable international labor standards in the wake of
increasing globalization3 6 Will soon be a 100-year long project. At the
close of the first World War, there was a need "to homogenize labor
practices across competing economies, blunt social unrest, and promote
'social justice."' 37 As a result, in 1919, the International Labour
38
Organization ("ILO") was established as part of the Treaty of Versailles.
While the United States had a major role in the creation of the ILO, it
39
wasn't until 1934 that the United States joined the organization. In a
joint resolution by Congress, which was approved by President Franklin
it
was
declared,
June
19,
1934,
Roosevelt
on
D.
[w]hereas-progress toward the solution of the problems of

34.
35.

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.

36. MARY JANE BOLLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22823, OVERVIEW OF LABOR
ENFORCEMENT ISSUES IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 1 (2016) ("The inclusion of enforceable labor

provisions - that is, those subject to dispute resolution procedures - in various trade agreement
authorities and related reciprocal trade agreements has evolved over time. At first, U.S. trade policy
focused on lowering tariffs on goods. It was later extended to various types of nontariff barriers."
(footnote omitted)).

37.

David Strang & Patricia Mei Yin Chang, The InternationalLabor Organizationand the

welfare state: institutionaleffects on national welfare spending, 1960-80, 47 INT'L ORG. J. 235, 240
(1993).

38. Id; Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, art. 427,
Treaty of Versailles ("[States] recognise that differences of climate, habits, and customs, of economic
opportunity and industrial tradition, make strict uniformity in the conditions of labour difficult of
immediate attainment. But, holding as they do, that labour should not be regarded merely as an article
of commerce, they think that there are methods and principles for regulating labour conditions which
all industrial communities should endeavour to apply, so far as their special circumstances will
permit.").
39.

Manley 0. Hudson, The Membership of the United States in the InternationalLabor

Organization,28 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 669 (Oct. 1934).
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international competition in industry can be made through
international action concerning the welfare of wage earners; and
[w]hereas the failure of a nation to establish humane conditions
of labor is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire
to maintain and improve the conditions in their own countries.4 0

It could be said that this attempt by the United States to be highly
involved with the development of international labor standards, but as the
same time very distant, has continued.
2. Post- World War II
After the Second World War, the international community was
negotiating two international agreements, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and the Charter for the International Trade
Organization ("ITO").4 1 However, Congress decided against approving
the ITO Charter and, thus, the GATT became the "general regulatory
institution for world trade." 42 The most significant evolution of GATT
occurred from 1986 to 1994, which is often called the "GATT Uruguay
Round."4 3 The Uruguay Round ultimately led to the establishment of the
World Trade Organization ("WTO") in 1995 .4 This revision included a
purportedly improved dispute settlement procedure that would strengthen
the enforcement and monitoring of ITAs.45 The WTO does not dictate
any labor principles or standards, so the ILO, an arm of the United Nations
("UN"), is the primary multilateral organization with the responsibility to
promote labor issues.46
40.

Id (quoting 78 Congressional Record, p. 12359).

41.

John H. Jackson, The GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic

Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 250, 250-52 (1967) ("GATT was intended to embody concrete tariff
commitments within the framework of the ITO when the latter came into existence.").

42. Id. at 252 ("This misdirected beginning, the political sensitivity and trade protectionism in
the United States in the late 1940's, and the shifting of the power over foreign economic affairs from
the legislative to the executive branch in this country all caused GATT to be established in a halting
'provisional' manner that continues to make it an anomaly among major international institutions.").
43. Andreas Bieler, John Hilary & Ingemar Lindberg, Trade Unions, 'Free Trade', and the
Problem of Transnational Solidarity: An Introduction, in FREE TRADE AND TRANSNATIONAL

LABOUR 4 (Andreas Bieler et al. eds., Routledge 2015).
44. Id.
45. Id. The creation of the WTO included a number of side agreements that "reached 'behind
the border' into the domestic policy space of WTO member countries." Id ("In short, developments
introduced during the Uruguay Round have undermined national sovereignty and challenged the
compromise of 'embedded liberalism' in developed countries .... .").
46. BOLLE, supra note 36, at 1 ("For nearly 90 years, the ILO has been working to create,
through adoption at its annual International Labor Conferences of Member countries, Conventions,
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3. Modern Pushfor InternationalLabor Standards
Of the 183 Conventions that the LO has adopted over the last ninety
years, eight of them define four "core labor" principles.47 In 1995,
Copenhagen, Denmark hosted a UN Social Summit.4 8 The Summit
established four categories of principles and rights that are fundamental
for workers: "(1) freedom of association and collective bargaining; (2) the
elimination of forced labor; (3) the elimination of child labor; and (4) the
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation." 49
Shortly after, in 1998, the ILO expanded these standards to all ILO
Member States, even those states that had not ratified the convention.50
This response, called the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up, "calls for reports by
developing countries that have not ratified one or more of the core
Conventions, on the status of their implementation of the various rights." 1
While the United States was slow to join the ILO in its early history,
the country has made unilateral attempts to influence labor standards in
developing countries by use of their "trade preference laws." 52 These
trade preference laws require that countries benefiting from one of the
programs take adequate steps to provide workers with "internationally
recognized worker rights" in order to obtain and maintain program
eligibility. 3 While the labor principles used by the United States have a
great deal of resemblance to the ILO core labor principles, it substitutes
the fourth principle listed above for "acceptable conditions of work with
respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and
health."5 4 There was an attempt by the United States and other developed
countries to form a WTO committee to inquire into the relationship
between international trade and labor.5 Among the 124 WTO members
which set international standards.").
47. Id
48. Id
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id
52. Id ("These trade preference laws cover five main programs: the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP), 1975; the CaribbeanBasin Initiative (CBI), 1983; the Andean TradePreference

Act (ATPA), 1991; the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), 2000; and the Haiti
Opportunity through PartnershipAct (HOPE), 2006.").
53. Id. ("These rights are listed in Trade Act of 1974, as amended (Section 507), as similar to
.").
ILO core labor principles listed above ...
54. Id. (quoting Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618 as amended), Sec. 507 (4)(E)).
55. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol35/iss2/7
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that debated, the majority, which included developing countries, argued
that the proposal was a "smokescreen for protectionism" by the more
industrialized nations and that the relationship had no proper role in the
framework of the WTO.56
While the ILO has existed since 1919, some contend that the
organization has been unsuccessful in achieving its purpose in light of the
many countries that continue to disregard its standards and resolutions.
The ILO does have the ability to monitor and supervise international labor
standards through one of its appropriate committees, but the
implementation and enforcement of those rights remains a problem.
Some more optimistic commentators on the ILO acknowledge that
counting the number of countries that have ratified its conventions is not
necessarily the best measure of the ILO's influence.5 9 Rather, it is the
debates created by the ILO that lead to influential change.60 In this light,
while the ILO has been portrayed as an international organization that
lacks the "teeth" to enforce and promote its standards, the real "teeth" of
the organization lies in the "web of actors sharing its values and
objectives." 61 In this manner, labor standards promoted by the ILO have
been "taken up by some national players and used as a tool to pressurize
national governments in negotiations."
The discussion of labor
standards in the negotiation of an ITA may be viewed through this lens.
B. U.S. TradeAgreements
Nearly all modern trade agreements are made law not by Congress's
traditional treaty power but rather by joint congressional-executive
agreements.63 Congress passed the Tariff Act of 1890, which "delegated
56.

Id.

57.

JAN-ERiK LANE, GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICS: PROMISES AND DANGERS 102 (2006).

58.

Id.

59.
Sandrine Kott & Joelle Droux, Introduction:A Global History Written from the ILO, in
GLOBALIZING SOCIAL RIGHTS: THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION AND BEYOND ix, 6

(Sandrine Kott & Joelle Droux eds., 2013) ("A simple way of measuring the ILO's influence has often
been to count the number of countries which have ratified the Conventions. This accounting method
is far from satisfactory since it does not take account of what ratification means in practice in the
various local contexts, or of the debate generated both before and after adoption of the Convention.").

60.

Id. ("Yet it is precisely these debates which have the greatest influence on national societies

and politicians ....

61.

).

Id at ix ("[I]ts influence largely depends on them, on their strength or weakness, especially

at the national level, where social and labour rights are actually implemented.").

62.

Id at 6.

63. JANE M. SMITH, DANIEL T. SHEDD & BRANDON J. MURRILL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RS97-896, WHY CERTAIN TRADE AGREEMENTS ARE APPROVED AS CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENTS RATHER THAN TREATIES 1, 2 (2013).
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tariff bargaining authority to the President and authorized him to suspend
existing duty-free treatment on particular items by proclamation."' The
United States has entered into fourteen trade agreements with a total of
twenty countries since 1985,5 and the WTO reports that more than 200
FTAs are currently in force.66 In the context of U.S. trade policy, FTAs
have had several "interrelated objectives." 67 The United States has looked
"to secure open markets for U.S. exports," "to protect domestic producers
from foreign unfair trade practices and from rapid surges in fairly traded
imports," "to control trade for foreign policy and national security
reasons" and "to help foster global trade to promote world economic
growth." 68 There have been several large steps taken by U.S. trade policy
in the forms of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, and while labor
has always been an important topic of discussion in their execution, the
nature of the discussion has shifted with the needs and concerns of the
economic climate at the time.69
The use of labor provisions in U.S. bilateral investment treaties
("BIT") has evolved tremendously, especially in light of the following
four factors coming into play:
First, the United States began to undertake FTA negotiations
Second, it became
with lesser-developed countries.
related to trade and
were
issues
labor
that
increasingly accepted
trade policy. Third, consensus broadened that globalization had
both costs and benefits. The benefits tend to be broadly
dispersed and include relatively higher economic growth and
productivity and greater access to lower-priced goods. The costs
tend to be concentrated in import-competing sectors where there
may be downward pressure on wages and job displacement. In
developing countries, pressures to become a low-cost producer
can lead to diminished working conditions and diminished
worker rights. Fourth, business groups have increasingly been
willing to make some concessions to labor groups in order to
64.

Id. ("The Supreme Court subsequently held that the authorizing statute, Section 3 of the

Tariff Act of 1890 did not unconstitutionally delegate either legislative or treaty-making authority to

the President.").
65.

Outcomes

of

Current

U.S.

Trade

Agreements,

U.S.

DEP'T

OF

STATE,

http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tpp/bta/fta/c26474.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2018).
66. WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31356, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS:
IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. TRADE POLICY 11 (Feb. 26, 2014).

67.
68.

Id. at 3.
Id.

69.

BOLLE, supranote 36, at 2.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol35/iss2/7

10

Reinauer: International Arbitration as a Hurdle for the Promotion of Labor
2018]

A HURDLE FOR THE PROMOTION OFLABOR STANDARDS

439

promote trade agreements and pave the way for greater trade
with and investment in developing countries.70
The United States' first two bilateral trade agreements, with Israel in
1985 and Canada in 1988, did not contain labor provisions, but this
changed in 1993 as the aforementioned factors became more relevant.n
1. The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 (RTAA)
The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 ("RTAA") is the first
piece of U.S. trade policy that resembles the modern day trade
agreement.72 In the wake of the Great Depression, it was apparent to U.S.
policy makers that the traditional approach to tariffs was inadequate.7 3
Some have described the Great Depression as an "international
phenomenon," arguing that "the economic collapse in Europe and
elsewhere led to a dramatic rise in foreign trade barriers and
discriminatory measures against U.S. goods." 7 4 Due to the urgent need

for economic recovery, there was a demand for a shift from the
"autonomously determined tariffs" of the past. 7 5 Labor was not of
primary concern in passing the RTAA but was seen to benefit from the
"export-oriented economic interests" of an "open trade regime." 76 The
purported benefits to labor is aptly described in terms of Adam Smith's
"invisible hand." 77 The increase in American exports abroad was thought
to "create employment, increase workers' wages thus raising the general
standard of living while at the same time protecting American
70.
71.
72.
REv. 411

Id.
Id
See Abraham Berglund, The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, 25 AM. ECON.
(1935).

73.
Douglas A. Irwin, From Smoot-Hawley to Reciprocal Trade Agreements: Changing the
Course of U.S: TradePolicy in the 1930's, in THE DEFINING MOMENT: THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND
THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 325, 326 (Michael D. Bordo et al.

eds.,1998).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77.
Trade"

See Ricardo Grinspun & Robert Kreklewich, Consolidating Neoliberal Reforms: "Free
as a Conditioning Framework, 43 STUD. IN POL. ECON. 33, 35 (1994),

http://spe.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/spe/article/viewFile/11253/8144 ("The ideological appeal of
these reforms is rooted in the neoclassical concept of the state: setting and enforcing the rules of the
microeconomic game, and maintaining macroeconomic stability (mainly through monetarist

policies). In principle, markets should be liberalized and deregulated to provide the 'cleanest' market
signals so that agents can respond to price incentives. With agents free to pursue private interests,
Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' is left to promote social interests.").
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"

industries."7 8 The potential adverse effects to American labor and
employment due to increased globalization was still of great concern in
1935, just as it is now.79 While it has been shown that early U.S. trade
policy had labor in mind when implementing the RTAA, the potential
benefits and detriments were viewed in the scope of a Smithian market
equilibrium rather any form of international enforcement."
U.S. trade policy attempted to extend more than a philosophical
safeguard to workers when Congress passed the Trade Expansion Act of
1962.1 With the support of labor unions, Congress included a new Trade
Adjustment Assistance ("TAA") program, which was "designed to help
82
The program
workers in industries adversely affected by trade."
apply for
could
imports
by
hurt
firms
or
provided that "[w]orkers
including
government financial, technical, and retraining assistance
relocation allowances - that would help firms to become more
8
competitive and the workers to move to other lines of endeavor." This
was an attempt to help those workers affected by imports while also
84
deemphasizing the need for trade restrictions. The TAA provision of the
Act states, "[p]ayment of a trade readjustment allowance shall be made to
an adversely affected worker who applies for such allowance for any week
of unemployment which begins after the 30t day after the date of the
enactment of this Act and after the date determined under section
302(d) ...
Chronologically, the FTAs negotiated by the United States since
1993 are "the North American Free Trade Agreement ... ; bilateral
agreements with Jordan, Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain,
and Oman;... CAFTA-DR, with the Dominican Republic and the five
Central American Countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Nicaragua); and bilateral FTAs with Peru, Colombia,
Panama, and South Korea." 8 6 For the last four agreements, leadership in
Congress and the Administration jointly agreed to a "Bipartisan Trade
78.

Berglund, supra note 72, at 417.

79. Id. ("The criterion adopted in making concessions, although not always stated, seems to be
whether a given reduction in tariff rates promises for this country greater industrial expansion and
more employment as a result of the concessions made abroad than the possible loss to the labor and
capital employed in the industries directly affected by reduced duties at home.").
Id.
80.
81.

U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SIGNIFICANT U.S. IMPORT

RESTRAINTS 70 (William Deese et al. eds., 2009).
82. Id.
83.

I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 23 (4th ed. 2005).

84.
85.

Id.
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, §332, 76 Stat. 872, 892 (1962).

86.

BOLLE, supra note 36, at 2.
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Deal," also known as the "May 10th Agreement," which represents a
"bipartisan compromise on labor language."" The additional labor
provisions in FTAs that the agreement calls for are as follows: "(1) a fully
enforceable commitment that FTA countries will adopt, maintain, and
enforce in their laws and practice, the basic international labor standards
as stated in the 1998 ILO Declaration; and (2) the use of identical
enforcement provisions for labor and the other provisions in the
agreements.""
Early attempts to homogenize international labor
standards has found some success," but, as it will be discussed, the effects
of these attempts have been considered less than adequate.
2. The North American Free TradeAgreement (NAFTA)
In the third and final debate of the 2016 Presidential election, a huge
topic of discussion was the effects of NAFTA on American labor. 90
Republican Nominee, Donald Trump, criticized the signing of NAFTA by
Hillary Clinton's husband, President William ("Bill") Clinton.9 1 Trump
claimed that, due to NAFTA, jobs were "being sucked out of our
economy." 92 Clinton claimed that she would appoint a trade prosecutor
to enforce the terms of any new trade pacts. 9 3 The debate over the TPP
led to a re-evaluation of the NAFTA. 9 4 In turn, NAFTA became a starting
point for critiques of the TPP's potential impacts on American labor as
well as labor abroad. 95
The motivations for the passing of NAFTA were much different than
those for the passing of the TPP. At the time, "[t]here was no internal or
external pressure for a framework to prevent future military conflicts,"
nor was there any "prospect of enhanced political integration" by any of
the NAFTA parties. 6 Additionally, unlike the present day, the free
87.
88.
89.

Id
Id.
Strang, supra note 37, at 240-41.

90.

Tory Newmyer, Clinton vs. Trump: Here's Who Won the Last PresidentialDebate,

FORTUNE (Oct. 20, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/19/clinton-vs-trump-heres-who-won-the-lastpresidential-debate/.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id
94. Andrew Flowers, Why Critics of Free Trade Are Talking China, Not NAFTA,
FIvETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 18, 2016, 6:54 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-critics-offree-trade-are-talking-china-not-nafta/.

95.

Id

96. FREDERICK M. ABBOT, North American Free Trade Agreement (1992), in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L. L. 1 (2014).
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movement of Mexican nationals was not a talking point that received
significant political support. 97 It is thought that a "selling point" of the
NAFTA deal in the early '90s was that by stimulating the Mexican
98
economy, there would be less migration to the Northern U.S. border.
President Bill Clinton supported the NAFTA deal and helped push for its
Congressional approval.99 It is also true that but President George H.W.
Bush was responsible for its negotiation and signing.o The passing of
NAFTA, for the most past, was bipartisan.10 1 But more Republicans than
Democrats voted for the deal, due mostly to the fact that the trade pact
was highly opposed by labor unions.1 02
NAFTA established free trade among North America's three largest
countries: Canada, Mexico and the United States. 10 3 The agreement was
put into force on January 1, 1994 and suspended the previous trade
agreement between Canada and the United States, that was put into force
on January 1 of 1989.104 President George H.W. Bush entered into
negotiations over NAFTA at the suggestion of the President of Mexico at
the time, Carlos Salinas.o' This was a transformative time for Mexico's
economy and was a period in which state ownership was transitioning to
private ownership. 10 6 It was also generally a time in which the Mexican
10 7
economy was opening up to imports and foreign investment.

97. Id ("[T]here was no significant political constituency in the US that sought to facilitate
free movement of Mexican nationals.").
98. Id.
99. Glenn Kessler, History lesson: More Republicans than Democrats supported NAFTA,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact2016),
9,
(May
POST
WASH.
checker/wp/2016/05/09/history-lesson-more-republicans-than-democrats-supported-nafta/.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. ABBOT, supranote 96, at 1.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. ("From the standpoint of the Mexican government, the NAFTA was an important
element in a broader transition from a closed to an open market economy. The US had long sought to
establish more favourable investment and trading terms with Mexico, and the proposal for a free trade
agreement was consistent with expressed US interests. Two-way trade between Canada and the US
far exceeded trade between Canada and Mexico, and the CUSFTA already promised to liberalize
trade between Canada and its major trading partner. Nonetheless, Canada's participation in the
negotiations allowed it to revisit some important subject-matter and to otherwise remain engaged in
a broader US plan for an eventual hemispheric Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) (which
ultimately did not materialize).").
107. Id.
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a. Labor's Opposition to NAFTA
Organized labor was a significant source of political opposition to
the negotiation of NAFTA in the United States."os Labor unions argued
that the "further opening [of] the US market to exports from Mexico
would encourage US businesses to relocate manufacturing plants and jobs
in Mexico to take advantage of lower labour costs and weaker
regulation."1 09 Ross Perot, a Texas entrepreneur and the "third-party"
candidate in the 1992 Presidential election, was an unlikely ally to labor
unions and centered his campaign around the potential loss of domestic
jobs that would come from NAFTA. 110 While he represented a major
party in the 2016 election, Trump played a similar role as an
entrepreneurial outsider and inflamed the concerns over U.S. trade
policies. 111
When it became time to debate an FTA between partnering countries
in North America, those representing labor interests were keen on the
potential adverse effects that NAFTA would have on American
workers. 112 In response to the labor concerns of NAFTA opposition, the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation ("NAALC") was
negotiated to accompany the trade agreement.1 13 The NAALC, being the
first "labor side agreement," provided an experimental opportunity "to see
the benefits and drawbacks of linking worker rights provisions to trade
agreements, and to evaluate the specific way in which they are linked." 1 4
Common minimum standards, however, were not included in the
NAALC.11 s "Rather it states that 'each Party shall ensure that its labor

108. Id.
109. Id. at 1-2.
110. Id. at 2 ("The votes that Ross Perot garnered in the November 1992 presidential election
arguably influenced the outcome of the Bush-Clinton contest. Perot's campaign certainly increased
the general public's attention to the NAFTA.").
111. See Jackie Calmes, Trump Scores Points on Trade in Debate, but Not So Much on
Accuracy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2016) https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/28/us/politics/hillaryclinton-donald-trump-trade-tpp-nafta.html.
112. ABBOT, supra note 96 at 1-2.

113. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation art. 2, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M 1499
[hereinafter NAFTA Side Agreement]; see Sabina Dewan & Lucas Ronconi, US. Free Trade
Agreements and Enforcement of Labor Law in Latin America at 4, (Inter-American Development

Bank Working Paper Series No. IDB-WP-543, (2014), ("It was negotiated as a means of encouraging
better labor standards and enforcement in Mexico, but also as a means of constraining the adverse
impacts of Mexico's lower labor costs on the United States.").
114. MARY JANE BOLLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-861-E, NAFTA LABOR SIDE
AGREEMENT: LESSONS FOR THE WORKER RIGHTS AND FAST-TRACK DEBATE 2 (2001),
http://digitalcommons.ilr.comell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1042&context-keyworkplace.

115.

Dewan & Ronconi, supra note 113, at 4.
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laws and regulations provide for high labor standards."' 1 16 In attempting
to push NAFTA through Congress, President Bill Clinton found an
unlikely ally in Republican Congressmen.' 17 In order to attract some of
the more modest Democrats, Clinton negotiated this "side agreement" in
the hopes that it would ease the concerns of the more Democratically
oriented labor unions. 1 8 The NAALC lays out a number of objectives
focused on labor that would accompany and facilitate the trade objectives
in the NAFTA."'9 Those objects are as follows:
ACKNOWLEDGING that protecting basic workers' rights will
encourage firms to adopt high-productivity competitive
strategies;
RESOLVED to promote, in accordance with their respective
laws, high-skill, high-productivity economic development in
North America by:
investing in continuous human resource development, including
for entry into the workforce and during periods of
unemployment;
promoting employment security and career opportunities for all
workers through referral and other employment services;
strengthening labor-management cooperation to promote
greater dialogue between worker organizations and employers
and to foster creativity and productivity in the workplace;
promoting higher living standards as productivity increases;
encouraging consultation and dialogue between labor, business
and government both in each country and in North America;
fostering investment with due regard for the importance of labor
laws and principles;
encouraging employers and employees in each country to
comply with labor laws and to work together in maintaining a

116.

Id.; see Timothy Meyer, Essay: Saving the PoliticalConsensus in FavorofFree Trade, 70

VAND. L. REv. 985, 1004 (2017) ("Labor interests soon became dissatisfied, however. The NAFTA
Side Agreement model of regulation did not require governments to adopt any particular labor
standards. Indeed, it explicitly recognized 'the right of each Party to establish its own domestic labor
standards.' Later, when President George W. Bush began pushing for a series of new free trade
agreements with Panama, Korea, Colombia, and Peru, advocates and their congressional allies argued
that labor and environmental chapters needed to contain more stringent requirements." (quoting

NAFTA Side Agreement)).
117.

ABBOT, supra note 96 at 2.

118.
119.

Id.
NAFTA Side Agreement, supra note 113.
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progressive, fair, safe and healthy working environment. 120
The NAALC side agreement is yet another example of the United States
taking an off-hand approach to strong international labor standards.
b. PurportedNegative Effects on Laborfrom NAFTA
While a primary motivation of the U.S. government was to increase
the labor market in Mexico in order to limit the number of migrant
immigrants from heading north to the border, 12 1 there was some concern
that NAFTA would have the opposite effect. 12 2 As one author put it,
"[t]he historically protective function of Mexican labor law is now under
assault."1 23 The author goes on to argue that multinational corporations
from its partnering North American countries to the north "are bringing
their anti-labor and anti-union policies to their employee and industrial
relations practices in Mexico."l 24 This opposition to NAFTA's purported
beneficial effects come in the form of Mexico's goverming party
"abandon[ing] effective enforcement of Mexican labor laws in an effort
to attract foreign investment."l 25 Much of this same criticism surrounded
the introduction and advocacy for the passing of the TPP.1 2 6
3. Trans-PacificPartnership(TPP)
President Barack Obama visited Nike headquarters in Beaverton,
Oregon on May 8, 2015 to promote the Trans-Pacific trade deal saying
"[1]et's just do it."l 27 The President stressed the importance of the U.S.'
role in writing the rules for international trade and pointed to provisions

120.

Id.

121.
122.

ABBOT, supra note 96, at 1.
Manuel Feuntes Muniz, The NAFTA Labor Side Accord in Mexico and Its Repercussions

for Workers, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 379, 380 (1995).
123. Id. at 379 ("The labor laws of Mexico represent an historic conquest for its workers and
the trade union movement. The Mexican Constitution itself guarantees workers' the right of

association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, the right to strike, and the eight-hour day.
The Federal Labor Law (FLL) amplifies the constitutional protections with extended provisions
protecting working conditions, health insurance, pensions, job descriptions, working schedules, and
job security. Like the original Wagner Act in the United States, Mexican labor law is tutelary in
nature: it is explicitly designed to protect workers against the power of owners and managers.").

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See discussion infra Section I.B.3.
127. Nick Gass, Obama on trade deal: 'Let's just do it', POLITICO (May 8, 2015 1:48 PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/obama-nike-visit-trade-deal- 117765.
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in the agreement that would strengthen labor standards in partnering
countries. 12 8 Many were perplexed that the President's choice of venue
would be Nike,1 2 9 a company with a very publicized history of exporting
labor to low wage countries where workers don't make enough income to
purchase the shoes they make.1 3 0 But others called it "a bold move that
showcases what can happen when U.S. companies commit to raising labor
standards abroad." 131 While Nike has made a considerable effort and
much progress in maintaining acceptable labor standards in its offshore
production, some still assert that "Nike is the symbol of what most
Americans are worried for their future under TPP."l32 That concern, one
that has been present with most modem trade deals, is the potential
negative effects that come as a result of increased trade with developing
13 3
nations that often have deficiencies in labor standards.
Investment treaties depart from traditional international agreements
and possess two fundamental innovations.1 34 Investors gain specific
substantive rights as well as legal avenues to remedy violations of those
substantive rights.13' This is not to say arbitration has never been used to
resolve international investment disputes. 136 Rather, the innovations give
private investors a cause of action against sovereign governments "to act
like 'private attorney generals,' and places the enforcement of public
international law rights in the hands of private individuals and
corporations." 3 7
It's clear that there has been a tremendous amount of effort to
connect international trade and labor. Additionally, as it will be discussed

128. President Obama on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Deal, C-SPAN (May 8, 2105)
https://www.c-span.org/video/?325909-1/president-obama-remarks-nike-transpacific-partnershipdeal.
129. Rebecca Kaplan, Why Obamapicked Nike to Pitch TradeDeal, CBS NEWS (May 7,2015,
6:00 AM), https://cbsnews.com/news/why-obama-picked-nike-to-pitch-trade/.

130. Id. ("In 1998, Nike's CEO at the time, Phil Knight, acknowledged in a speech that the
company's reputation had deteriorated so badly that its products had 'become synonymous with slave
wages, forced overtime and arbitrary abuse,' and he promised change.").

131.

Id ("'It's almost like throwing people a curveball - why would you ever go there given

their reputation?' Brown University Professor Richard Locke, who studies labor and environmental

conditions in global supply chains and has watched Nike for years, told CBS News. But he concedes
the company has come a long way since its disgrace in the 1990s.").

132.

Id (quoting Lori Wallach, the director of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch).

Culbertson, supra note 18.
133.
Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing
134.
Public InternationalLaw Through InconsistentDecisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1529 (2005).

135. Id.
136. Guillermo A. Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration:
NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 366 (2003).
137. Franck, supra note 134, at 1537-38.
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in Part II, there has been additional effort to protect investor's interests
against actions by a host state that may disrupt market expectations. The
enforcement of these interest has found its "teeth" in international
arbitration. However, it is likely the case that the latter interest's "teeth"
has far more bite than the former.
II. EMERSION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

Part II of this note describes the emersion of international arbitration
that has led to the creation of Investor-State arbitration. The United States
was influential in the creation of arbitration on the international stage and
continues to be successful in its development and application.1 38 For some
time, international arbitration was reserved mostly for conflicts between
States, but necessity soon led to the creation of a claim to action for a
foreign investor against a host state. The use of international arbitration
is preferred, as opposed to domestic or international litigation, for reasons
of cost, efficiency and neutrality.139
A. Jay Treaty
The earliest form of treaty-based investment arbitration entered by
the United States was in 1794.140 The agreement, often called the "Jay
Treaty,"l 4 1 "gave British creditors the right to arbitrate claims of alleged
despoliation by American citizens and residents."1 42 It has been said that
the Jay Treaty of 1794 was the genesis of international arbitration. 14 3
George Washington pushed for its creation in order to avoid a potential
conflict with Great Britain and commissioned Chief Justice John Jay to
negotiate the deal.144 There are several similarities between the Jay Treaty
138. Roger P. Alford, The American Influence on InternationalArbitration, 19 OHIO ST. J. DiSP.
RESOL. 69, 70-72 (2003).
139. Gary Born & Wendy Miles, Global Trends in InternationalArbitration, JUST. STUD. CTR.
OF THE AMERICAS,
http://desalbiblioteca.cejamericas.org/bitstream/handle/2015/812/GlobalTrends-in-International-Arbitration.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (last visited Mar. 14, 2017) ("The
attractions of arbitration have remained largely constant since antiquity: parties choose to arbitrate in
order to avoid the expense, delays, and rigidities of litigation in state courts, as well as the peculiar
uncertainties of international litigation (including jurisdictional, choice-of-law and enforcement
disputes). Rather, they seek neutral, expert dispute resolution in a tribunal of their choosing and a
single, centralized forum.").
140. Alvarez & Park, supra note 136, at 366.
141. Id. at 366.
142. Id. at 367.
143. Alford, supra note 138, at 72.
144. Id.
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and modem day international arbitration agreements, 14 and likewise, the
14 6
The Treaty
debate surrounding the 1794 Treaty sounds oddly familiar.
of the
President
third
eventual
the
against
Washington
George
pinned
14 7
by
received
criticism
the
like
Much
United States, Thomas Jefferson.
more
the modem day ISDS, "Jefferson described the treaty as 'nothing
than a treaty of alliance between England and the Anglomen of this
1 48
While
country against the legislature and people of the United States."'
14 9 it
Treaty,
Jay
the
over
there was plenty of dissent in the United States
did not stop the United States from imposing a great deal of influence on
the development of international arbitration. 5 0
B. State-State Arbitration
State to state arbitration was used almost exclusively in BITs before
1969."' The first instance of the more modem arbitration tribunal was
1 52
The function of the
created in 1959 between Germany and Pakistan.
tribunal was outlined in Article 11 of the Treaty for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments.1 53 If a dispute arose, the partnering states
would enter into consultation in the International Court of Justice ("ICJ")
54
Once
and attempt to resolve the dispute "in the spirit of friendship."'

145. Id. at 72-74 ("Many of the features utilized in that treaty will sound familiar today. They
include: (1) the ineffectiveness of domestic courts precipitated recourse to international arbitration;
(2) the utilization of party-appointed arbitrators and a chair selected by those arbitrators; (3) arbitrator
declarations affirming their impartiality and independence; (4) the payment of arbitrators to be shared
equally by both sides; (5) the manner of replacement of arbitrators; (6) discovery techniques including
oral testimony, written depositions, and document production; (7) determinations to be made not
simply as law mandates, but as equity and justice require; (8) the finality of awards; and (9) the
commitment by the non-prevailing party to honor the award.").

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
INT'L

Id. at 72.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 72-77.
Nathalie Bemasconi-Osterwalder, State-State Dispute Settlement in Investment Treaties,
INST.

FOR

SUSTAINABLE

DEvELOPMENT,

41

(Oct.

2014),

https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/best-practices-state-state-dispute-settlementinvestment-treaties.pdf.
152.

Investor-stateDispute Settlement: The ArbitrationGame, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 11, 2014),

2
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/ 1623756-governments-are-souringtreaties-protect-foreign-investors-arbitration.
153. Treaty for the Promotion of Protection of Investments, Pakistan-Federal Republic of
Germany, art. XI, Nov. 25, 1959.

Christian Tietje, et al., The Impact of Investor-State-Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the
154.
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE

NETHERLANDS, 7, 21 (June 24, 2014), http://media.leidenuniv.nllegacy/joint-public-hearing.pdf.
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consultation was exhausted and settlement in the ICJ could not be reached,
the treaty provided an arbitration mechanism to settle the dispute.155 A
panel of three arbitrators, much like the modem format of the ISDS, would
then oversee the case under their own rules of procedure.' 5 6 It wasn't until
the start of the mid-20b Century that BITs began to allow private investors
to bring claims directly against a host state. 157 Before the creation of the
ISDS type arbitration tribunal, remedies for harm to investment by a
country's violation of international law were typically limited to:
(1) negotiating directly with the host government; (2) suing the
host government in the sovereign's own courts where defenses
of sovereign immunity may be readily available; (3) requesting
the home government to negotiate diplomatically with the host
government; or (4) requesting the home government to espouse
a claim on their behalf before the International Court of Justice,
provided the ICJ had jurisdiction.15 8
These options, while useful in resolving some disputes, were for the most
part ineffective and ultimately left investors without an appropriate
avenue for relief."' This reliance on a political or diplomatic process to
enforce an investor's protection under a treaty or substantive right often
proved unpredictable and unfruitful.16 0
C. Investor-StateArbitration
On June 1, 1966, the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of other States was ratified by
President Lyndon B. Johnson.16'
This led to the creation of the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"). 16 2
Article 27 of the Convention "expressly prohibits a Contracting State from
giving diplomatic protection, or bringing an international claim, in respect
of a dispute which one of its nationals and another Contracting State have

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id

161.

Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of

Other States, Aug. 27, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270.
162. Id.
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16 3
The original draft of the
consented to submit to ICSID arbitration."
27, stipulates,
Article
now
is
and
28
Article
was
which
provision,

No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection or bring
an international claim in respect of a dispute which one of its
nationals and another Contracting State shall have consented to
submit or shall have submitted to arbitration pursuant to this
Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall have
failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in such
dispute. 16 4
However, the provision does not "deprive[] the government of the
investor of its own right to present an international claim for an injury to
its own interests arising from the alleged violation of international law
that resulted in an injury to its national."16 ' This limits a state's ability to
bring an action against another state on behalf of one of its national
entities, such as an investor.166 But it also puts arbitration at the forefront
as the preferred method of resolving international investment disputes.
While BITs are continually used under this model, more recently,
1 67
As one
FTAs have begun including their own investment chapters.
[International
and
BITs
of
generation'
'new
"[t]his
it,
put
commenter
Investment Agreements] (HAs) can be characterized by three trends: (1)
express inclusion of social welfare concerns into the agreements; (2) new
163.

Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The

Roles ofICSID and MTGA, I ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L. J. 1,15 (1992).
164. Draft Convention: Working Papers for the Legal Committee (Sept. 11, 1964), in 11-1
HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION 610, 622-23 (Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv'r Dispute eds.,
1968); see Annotated First Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Settlement of Investment

Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (Aug. 9, 1963), in H-1 HISTORY OF THE ICSID
CONVENTION 133, 163-64 (Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv'r Dispute eds., 1968) ("Comment 12.
Unlike Section 16, which gives merely a rule of interpretation, Section 17 lays down a rule of
substantive law. It should be noted that this section constitutes a significant innovation. 13. The
proposed Convention would recognize the right of an investor, within specified limits, to proceed in
his own name against a foreign State before an arbitral tribunal constituted pursuant to the Convention
instead of seeking the diplomatic protection of his State or having that State bring an international
claim. It would seem to be a natural concomitant of the recognition of the investor's right of direct
access to an international jurisdiction, to exclude action by his national State in cases in which such
direct access has been availed of by, or is available to, the investor, whether as plaintiff or defendant,
under the Convention. Since the exclusion of the national State rests on the premise that the other
Contracting State party to the dispute will abide by the provisions of the Convention, the rule of
exclusion is subject to an exception in the event that that premise falls away. In such a case rights of
providing diplomatic protection and of bringing an international claim remain unaffected.").
165. Shihata, supranote 163, at 4.
166. Id.
167. Tietje, et al., supra note 154, at 23.
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analytical devices for arbitrators such as more clearly defined terms; and
(3) refined and streamlined procedural mechanisms to increase
transparency and accountability." 1 6 8 Included in the US 2004 Model BIT
is a provision emphasizing the "protection of health, safety, and the
environment, and the promotion of internationally recognized labor
rights."l69 In turn, U.S. negotiations in trade agreements have made a
point to include public policy exemptions from arbitration. This has
primarily been done to protect the enforcement of both labor and
environmental commitments by parties to a treaty. It seems clear that the
effective enforcement of FTAs, in light of growing partnerships with
developing countries, has remained a central issue among those concerned
with U.S. trade policy and labor rights.o
1. NAFTA's Investor-State Dispute Settlement
NAFTA's Investor-State Dispute Settlement process is outlined in
Chapter 11 of the agreement.171 Article 1115 of the Chapter defines the
purpose as, "[w]ithout prejudice to the rights and obligations of the Parties
under Chapter Twenty ... ,this Section establishes a mechanism for the
settlement of investment disputes that assures both equal treatment among
investors of the Parties in accordance with the principle of international
reciprocity and due process before an impartial tribunal." 1 72 The first
section of Chapter 11 deals with the substantive obligations the partnering
states owe to investors in their territory.1 73 The second section of Chapter
11 "sets forth the arbitration procedure" and "permits an investor from
one NAFTA State Party to submit to arbitration a claim that another
NAFTA State Party has violated one or more of the first section's
obligations and caused loss or damage to the investor or investment."1 74
NAFTA's ISDS mechanism does not drastically differ from previous
168.
169.

Id.
Id. at 24.

170.
CATHLEEN CIMINO-ISACCS, LABOR STANDARDS IN THE TPP IN ASSESSING THE TRANSPACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 42 (Jeffry J. Schott & Cathleen Cimino-Isaces eds., Peterson Inst. for Int'l

Econs. 2016).
171. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S. Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993).
172. Id.
173.

Barton Legum, The Innovation of Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA, 43 HARV.

INT'L L.J. 531, 532 (2002) ("Most of these obligations-such as the obligation to accord national
treatment and most-favored-nation treatment, the prohibition of so-called 'performance
requirements,' and the requirement that transfers relating to investment be freely permitted-and
treaty-based, with no equivalent in customary international law.").

174.

Id. at 532-33.
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compositions, but is unique in that it allows investor protections between
two highly developed economies.17 5
More recently, NAFTA's ISDS provisions have gained additional
criticism. 17 6 Because the Obama administration rejected the construction

of the Keystone XL oil pipeline, TransCanada Corp. filed a NAFTA
Chapter 11 claim to recover $15 billion in costs and damages.1 77 While
this claim involved an environmental issue, it highlights the potential
threat the ISDS poses to domestic public interests. 17 8 As one piece of
criticism points out, in light of this claim under NAFTA, "[fjoreign
companies could exploit the Investor-State dispute settlement provisions
in the Trans-Pacific Partnership to weaken U.S. environmental policy and
labor protections." 1 79
2. The Trans-PacificPartnership(TPP)

'

In the TPP's Chapter Summary on Labor, it claims, "[t]o date, only
four trade agreements in the world provide for strong, fully-enforceable
requirements to adopt and maintain fundamental ILO labor rights and to
effectively enforce laws - the U.S. Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with
Peru, Panama, Colombia, and Korea. TPP's Labor chapter extends these
requirements to 10 new countries."' 8 0
The text of the TPP devoted the entirety of Article 19 to "Labour."' 8
Article 19.3 of the text outlines several rights contained in the ILO
Declaration:
1. Each Party shall adopt and maintain in its statutes and
regulations, and practices thereunder, the following rights as
stated in the ILO Declaration: (a) freedom of association and the
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; (b) the
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; (c) the

175.

Id. at 537-38.

176.

See Jennifer A. Diouhy, TransCanadaFiles $15B Nafia Claim on Keystone XL Rejection,

BLOOMBERG (June 25, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-25/transcanadafiles-1 5b-nafta-claim-on-keystone-xl-rejection.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180.

TPP

Chapter

19

Summary,

OFF.

U.S.

TRADE

REPRESENTATIVE,

at

4,

https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Chapter-Summary-Labour-1.pdf, (last visited Apr. 18, 2018).
181. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art. 19, Feb. 4, 2016, OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Labour.pdf [hereinafter TPP
Agreement].
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effective abolition of child labour and, for the purposes of this
Agreement, a prohibition on the worst forms of child labour; and
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment
and occupation. 2. Each Party shall adopt and maintain statutes
and regulations, and practices thereunder, governing acceptable
conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of
work, and occupational safety and health. 18 2
While the text of the TPP proclaims obligations onto the partnering
states to abide by these standards, Article 19.2(2) dictates that "[t]he
Parties recognise that, as stated in paragraph 5 of the LO Declaration,
labour standards should not be used for protectionist trade purposes." 8 3
The text of the TPP includes the labor standards in Article 19 as grounds
to enter into dispute settlement and outlines the composition of the panel
in a manner almost identical to those before. Article 28.9(5) states,
For a dispute arising under Chapter 19 (Labour)... each
disputing Party shall select panellists in accordance with the
following requirements, in addition to those set out in Article
28.10.1 (Qualifications of Panellists): (a) in any dispute arising
under Chapter 19 (Labour), panellists other than the chair shall
have expertise or experience in labour law or practice. 18 4
It could be said that the TPP's ISDS provisions will not worsen the
current status of enforcing labor standards on an international level, but
rather it "creates a lab to test and evaluate" the efficiency of such
provisions.' But, as it will be discussed below in Part III of this note,
many disagree with this assessment and claim that the modern use of the
ISDS creates incentives for countries to keep their labor standards low.

182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id.
Id.

185. Todd Tucker, Accountability in a Regime Complex: ChartingPolicy Reforms for InvestorState
Dispute
Settlement,
ROOSEVELT
INST.
31
(Sept.
2,
2016),
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmn?abstractid=2840217 ("Labor and environmental groups
will never be able to get as much out of international law as they will domestic law. There's very
limited data on which to base such a conclusion: remedies have heretofore been incredibly weak at
the international level. The proposal creates a lab to test and evaluate such predictions. If it doesn't
work, we are not worse off than where we are today.").
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III. CRITICISM OF INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION'S EFFECTS ON
INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS

Investor-State arbitration has been criticized for both its composition
and its practical application. Most notably, Investor-State arbitration has
possessed a commercially oriented corporate perspective rather than a
state-oriented perspective.18 6 In other words, the current system of
arbitration between states and investors is biased towards corporate
interests rather than the sovereign interests of a state to regulate certain
public interests. While international arbitration has been touted as a
7
concrete enforcement mechanism for international labor standards,'1 it
8
An article
could be said that the tribunals may have the opposite effect.'
hypothetical:
following
the
posits
published by THE ATLANTIC
It is January 2017. The mayor of San Francisco signs a bill that
will raise the minimum wage of all workers from $8 to $16 an
hour effective July 1st. His lawyers assure him that neither
federal nor California minimum wage laws forbid that and that
it is fine under the U.S. Constitution. Then, a month later, a
Vietnamese company that owns 15 restaurants in San Francisco
files a lawsuit saying that the pay increase violates the "investor
protection" provisions of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
agreement recently approved by Congress. The lawsuit is not in
a federal or state court, but instead will be heard by three private
arbitrators; the United States government is the sole defendant;
89
and the city can participate only if the U.S. allows it.1
THE ATLANTIC article suggests that such an example could lead to
an influx of similar claims by other foreign investors from a number of
different business areas. 9 0 This, in turn, could incentivize Congress or
186. See Caroline Simson, ISDS Reform Will Have To Come From Outside, Reichler Says, LAW
360 (Aug. 2, 2016 4:05 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/823665/isds-reform-will-have-tocome-from-outside-reichler-says.
Simon Lester, Responding to the White House Response on ISDS, CATO AT LIBERTY BLOG
187.

POST (Feb. 27,2015 12:33 PM), http://www.cato.org/blog/responding-white-house-defense-investorstate-dispute-settlement ("I don't know whether an ISDS complaint could be made against U.S.
For that matter, ISDS complaints could probably be brought in order to raise
minimum wage laws ...
labor and environmental standards! Some ISDS provisions are broad enough to cover just about

anything.").
188.

Alan Morrison, Is the Trans-PacificPartnershipUnconstitutional?,THE ATLANTIC (June

23, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/tpp-isds-constitution/396389/.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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others to limit increases in workers' wages, benefits, or protections in
order to prevent other foreign investors from looking to the U.S. Treasury
for relief.191 This concern may be over-exaggerated considering, as it will
be discussed later, that the United States has never lost a claim in an
Investor-State arbitration.' 9 2 However, the example is strikingly similar
to the previously mentioned Veolia case, in which a foreign investor
brought a claim against Egypt for increasing their minimum wage.' 9 3 The
fear is that Investor-State arbitration may evolve into a more dynamic tool
to stifle workers, rather than a tool to protect them.1 94
The first instance of a U.S. complaint against a country for
insufficient labor standards under a trade agreement arose out of the 2005
Dominic Republic Central America United States Free Trade Agreement
("CAFTA-DR").'19
In 2011, the United States brought a complaint
against Guatemala for its labor practices.1 9 6 It wasn't until September 18,
2014, that Michael Froman, the United States Trade Representative at the
time, announced that the United States was proceeding with a case against
Guatemala under the CAFTA-DR.1 97 The case has yet to come to a
close.'19 This case illustrates the slow process of attempts to enforce labor
standards
in
an
ITA
by
way
of
arbitration.1 99
A. NAFTA's ISDS
Similar to much of the criticism towards the ISDS system, those
critics of the ISDS mechanism contained in NAFTA's Chapter 11 are
directed towards the potential for corporate entities to effectively weaken
191.

Id.

192.
193.

See infra text accompanying note 209.
See supra note 13.

194.

Rimmer, supra note 13 ("There is a real risk that it will benefit the wealthiest sliver of the

American and global elite at the expense of everyone else. [Professor Joseph Stiglitz] worries about
the impact of the deal upon equality: The fact that such a plan is under consideration at all is testament
to how deeply inequality reverberates through our economic policies. He warns: Enriching
corporations-as the Trans-Pacific Partnershipwould-will not necessarily help those in the
middle, let alone those at the bottom".) (internal quotations omitted).
195. In the Matter of Guatemala -Issues Relating to the Obligations Under Article 16.2.1 (a) of
the CAFTA-DR, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/labor/bilateral-and-

regional-trade-agreements/guatemala-submission-under-cafta-dr (last visited Apr. 19, 2018).
196. Id ("On May 16, 2011, the United States requested a meeting... regarding the
Government of Guatemala's failure to meet its obligations under the Labor Chapter of CAFTA-DR,
with respect to effective enforcement of Guatemalan labor laws related to the right of association, the
right to organize and bargain collectively, and acceptable conditions of work.").

197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id.
See id
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the partnering states' ability to promote the public interest by either
legislation or regulation.2 00 Since the creation of NAFTA's Chapter 11,
the United States has been sued seventeen times but has yet to lose a
case. 201 In turn, "the United States has yet to encounter a situation in
which a domestic regulation came under threat by the ruling of an
investment arbitration panel."2 02 While the United States has little to fear
for its sovereignty, for now, the potential for such effects pose long term
concerns for domestic policy but more eminent concerns for workers in
developing countries.
B. TPP'sISDS Provisions
Before the text of the TPP was released, many had hoped that ISDS
20 3
provisions would account for previous deficiencies contained in FTAs.
Considering the commentary that has been made since its release and
withdrawal from it, it appears that many of those shortcomings have not
been resolved. 2 04 The most notable criticism of the tribunals has come
20 5
On
from Senator Elizabeth Warren and Senator Bernie Sanders.
Senate
the
to
speech
a
floor
delivered
Warren
Senator
2016,
2,
February
arguing that the ISDS provisions contained in the TPP favor big
20 6
In regards
corporations rather than the workers that they may employ.
to what she has called "[a] rigged process [that] produces a rigged
outcome," Warren said, "[w]ith ISDS, big companies get the right to
challenge laws they don't like, not in courts, but in front of industryfriendly arbitration panels that sit outside of any court system. Those
panels can force taxpayers to write huge checks to big corporations-with
no appeals."2 07 Warren points out that "[w]orkers, environmentalists, and
human rights advocates don't get that special right; only corporations

200.

William L. Owen, Investment Arbitration Under NAFTA

Chapter 11: A Threat to

Sovereignty ofMember States?, 39 CAN. U.S. L.J. 55, 55 (2015).
201. Id. at 57.
202. Id. ("Commentators may argue that the U.S. is imposing a double-standard on developing
nations as its leverage repels challenges to domestic regulations while well-resourced, U.S.
multinational firms are able to extract gains from less powerful developing nations.").
203. See Jackie Calmes, Trans-Pacific Partnership Text Released, Waving Green Flag for

Debate, N.Y. TIMEs (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/

20

15/11/06/business/

interational/trans-pacific-trade-deal-tpp-vietnam-labor-rights.html?_r=0.
Lise Johnson et al., Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Public Interest and U.S. Domestic
204.
Law, COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV. (2015), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/05/Investor-

State-Dispute-Settlement-Public-Interest-and-U.S.-Domestic-Law-FINAL-May-19-8.pdf.
205.
206.

Warren, supra note 2; C-SPAN, supra note 2.
Warren, supra note 2.

207.

Id
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do."208 This criticism will be important in formulating a proposed
solution. This note will seek to bring the process afforded to investors
more in line with those afforded to labor groups.
Several notable scholars have also spoken out against the ISDS
provisions in the TPP. 2 09 As Senator. Warren points out, Joe Stiglitz, the
Nobel Prize-winning economist, and Harvard Law Professor Laurence
Tribe have noted that "if ISDS panels force countries to pay high enough
fines, the countries will 'voluntarily' drop the health, safety, labor and
environmental laws that big corporations don't like." 210 Joseph Stiglitz
wrote in a piece for the Roosevelt Institute asserting that "the most
economically significant provisions [outlined in the TPP] are not cuts to
trade barriers," but rather the investment chapter containing the ISDS
211
Stiglitz argues that while the purported goal of ISDS
process.
provisions "is to increase security for investors in states without an
adequate 'rule of law[,]'. . . the U.S.['s] insist[ence] on the [ISDS] in
Europe ... suggests another motive .. ..
Because Europe has "legal
safeguards [that] are as strong as they are in the U.S.," the push for ISDS
provisions comes from "the desire to make it harder to adopt new financial
regulations, environmental laws, worker protections, and food and health
safety standards."2 13
Not only did the TPP do little to the enforcement of labor standards
through dispute settlement, but it also falls short of protecting a state's
ability to regulate public interest.2 14 Proponents of the text point to a
provision contained in Article 9.16 that states, "[n]othing in this Chapter
shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or
enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it
considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is
undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental, health or other
regulatory objectives." 215 This will also play an important role in the
formulation of a solution. This note will argue for more specific
exceptions for state actions that bring labor laws more in line with
international standards.
208.
209.
210.

Id.
Id.
Id.

211.
Joseph Stiglitz, Beware of TPP'sInvestor-State Dispute Settlement Provision,ROOSEVELT
INST. (Mar. 28, 2016), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/beware-tpps-investor-state-dispute-settlementprovision/.

212.
213.
214.
215.

Id
Id.
Id.
TPP Agreement, supra note 181.
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IV. THE EVALUATION OF OTHER SOLUTIONS
Part IV of this note will evaluate varying solutions to the threat
Investor-State arbitration poses to labor standards. Many of these
solutions are broad and over-arching. While there is a ripe atmosphere
2 16
This
for change, a broad change to the system may be too ambitious.
attempt
and
will
consideration
into
solutions
proposed
other
note will take
to find a path of least resistance.
A. The United States Should Scrap the ISDS
Several scholars and authors have argued for the complete removal
of the ISDS mechanism from U.S. trade agreements.2 17 As the inclusion
of the ISDS has grown in recent years, opponents of the systems argue
that the United States should not further entrench itself in the system
outlined in recent trade agreements, such as the TPP and the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership 218 ("T-TIP") . 21 9 As the Cato Institute
put it, "[fjor practical, economic, legal, and political reasons, ISDS
subverts prospects for U.S. trade liberalization." 2 20 Metaphorically
speaking, "[i]n the proverbial airplane that is down one engine and losing
altitude, throwing ISDS out of the cargo hold to reduce unnecessary
weight is the best solution."2 2 1
The Cato Institute provides eight reasons why the United States
should scrap the ISDS, but only four will be discussed.2 22 First, Cato

Cerna, supranote 17, at 16.
216.
See, e.g., Dan Ikenson, Eight Reasons To Purge Investor-State Dispute Settlement From
217.
Trade Agreements, FORBES (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danikenson/2014/03/04/
3
eight-reasons-to-purge-investor-state-dispute-settlement-from-trade-agreements/# 14cla5721d2.
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), OFF. U.S. TRADE REP.,
218.

https://ustr.gov/ttip (last visited Apr. 19, 2018) ("The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(T-TIP) is an ambitious, comprehensive, and high-standard trade and investment agreement being
negotiated between the United States and the European Union (EU). T-TIP will help unlock
opportunity for American families, workers, businesses, farmers, and ranchers through increased
access to European markets for Made-in-America goods and services. This will help to promote U.S.
international competiveness, jobs and growth.").
219. Johnson et al., supra note 204, at 16 ("Rather than further entrenching ISDS through TPP,
TTIP, or other treaties, the US should take the more considered step to remove ISDS from future

[trade] agreements.").
Daniel Ikenson, A Compromise to Advance the Trade Agenda: Purge Negotiations of
220.
Investor-StateDispute Settlement, 57 FREE TRADE BULL. 2 (Mar. 4, 2014).

221.
222.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 2-4.
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claims that the "ISDS is overkill."223 In light of large multinational
companies' sophistication, they are more than capable of calculating risks
on the international level and weighing those risks with potential return
on investments.224 Second, "ISDS socializes the risk of foreign direct
investment."225 Cato contends that pressure to include ISDS provisions
from the United States on other countries in the process of negotiating
trade deals may affect partnering countries' willingness to agree to other
reforms.226 Third, "ISDS encourages 'discretionary' outsourcing."22 7 An
advantage that has long made the United States an attractive place for
foreign investment is the county's rule of law regarding property rights.228
Cato points out, however, as of recent the United States has been less
appealing to foreign investment, having had its share of global foreign
direct investment decline since the late '90s.229 Fourth, Cato contends that
"U.S. laws and regulations will be exposed to ISDS challenges with
increasing frequency." 230 While the number of cases against the United
States may be on the rise,23 1 this may be one of the less compelling reasons
provided by the Cato Institute. As stated previously, the United States has
yet to lose a case in ISDS arbitration.23 2 And it may be true that "[a]s the
percentage of global Fortune 500 companies domiciled outside the United
States continues to increase, U.S. laws and regulations are likely to come

223. Id. at 2 ("Governments are competing to attract productive investment to keep their citizens
employed and their economies growing. Accordingly, it is imperative to maintain smart, transparent,

predictable policies that are administered fairly and nondiscriminatorily. Asset expropriation or other
forms of shabby treatment of foreign companies is not likely to be rewarded by new investment.").

224.

Id ("Multinational companies can mitigate their own risk by purchasing private insurance

policies. Alternatively, they can condition investment on the host government's agreeing to other

protections, contractually. Whether the host agrees would be influenced by the supply of potential
investors and the strings they would attach.").
225. Id
226. Id at 2-3 ("When other governments oppose, but ultimately concede to, U.S. demands for
ISDS provisions, they may be less willing to agree to other reforms, such as greater market access,
that would benefit other U.S. interests. That is an externality or a cost borne by those who don't benefit

from that cost being incurred. In this regard, ISDS is a subsidy for MNCs and a tax on everyone
else.").

227. Id. at 3.
228. Id.
229. Id. ("While ISDS may benefit U.S. companies looking to invest abroad, it neutralizes what
was once a big U.S. advantage in the competition to attract investment. Respect for property rights
and the rule of law have been relative U.S. strengths, but ISDS mitigates those U.S. advantages.
Access to ISDS could be the decisive factor in a company's decision to invest in a research center in
Brazil, instead of the United States.").
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See supra text accompanying note 201.
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under greater scrutiny."233 But a complete elimination of the ISDS may
limit the U.S. tactical advantage in international trade in the wake of
growing globalization.
While these recommendations have been considered in the
production of this note, some argue that international arbitration between
investors and states is at a point of no return.234 For example,
Notwithstanding these criticisms, it is widely accepted that
recourse to international arbitration under investment treaties is
here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future. At the same time,
the system is not without flexibility to adapt. There are ways and
means to address shortcomings, to develop alternative
approaches, and to develop rules and guidelines to ensure that
the system works better.23 5
This note will take the opinion into consideration in proposing solutions
and will attempt to provide not an ideal solution, but one that may be more
practically obtainable.
B. Investor-StateDisputes Should be Resolved Between States
There are many in the United States and abroad that advocate for a
shift back to the traditional method of resolving investment dispute in
domestic courts.2 36 The point of view shows distrust in private parties'
ability to arbitrate but also holds favorable opinions towards investor
protection in international trade agreements.237 The appeal of this point
of view lies with state control and the assurance that states will rectify the
dispute in a diplomatic manner. 238 The subsequent proposed solution
attempts to account for that appeal. But, rather than return to the
traditional government-government system, the proposed solution will
233. Ikenson, supra note 220, at 3 ("The specter of foreign companies prevailing in challenges
of U.S. laws outside the U.S. legal system would frustrate further the task of selling trade to a skeptical
public and would reward trade critics who have been warning of just such an outcome for many

years.").
&

ANNA JOUBIN-BRET & JEAN E. KALICKI, Introduction to RESHAPING THE INVESTOR234.
STATE DISPUTE SETILEMENT SYSTEM: JOURNEYS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 1, 3 (Jean E. Kalicki

Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2015).
2 3 5. Id.
Marco Bronckers, Is Investor-State Dispute Settlement (7SDS) Superior to Litigation
236.
Before Domestic Courts?: An EU View on Bilateral Trade Agreements, 18 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 655

(2015).
237.
238.

Id. at 657-58.
See id
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attempt to shift the orientation of the ISDS to a more state perspective by
increasing state involvement and participation by way of a state review
process.
C. The ICSID Arbitration ProcessShould be Reformed
Some suggest that the ICSID should be amended and changed.2 39
These changes would include raising the qualifications of arbitrators,24 0
increasing transparency,24 1 creating an appeals process,242 and broadening
the scope to include public interest. 24 3 While this proposal would provide

comprehensive effects to the international arbitral process, the method of
amending the ICSID Convention requires too many actors to affect
realistic change. 24 This is not to say that the ICSID cannot be amended,2 45
but rather, the need for consensuS 246 will lead to insufficient impacts on
labor standards.
D. Investors Have Domestic Courts at their Disposal
Few have advocated for a complete shift from Investor-State
arbitration to domestic court remedies.2 47 One European commentator
suggests that domestic courts should be utilized more often than it
currently is but recognizes that the difficulties of doing so in the United
States, 248 a more practical proposal, one that could accompany this note's
proposal, is the use of the "local remedies rule." 2 4 9 The "local remedies

239.
Elizabeth Moul, The InternationalCentrefor the Settlement of Investment Disputes and
the Developing World: Creatinga Mutual Confidence in the InternationalInvestment Regime, 55

SANTA CLARA L. REv. 881, 912-13 (2015) ("With the growth of international investment agreements
and the resulting growth of investor-state arbitrations, additional changes to the arbitration process
are necessary to increase legitimacy .....
240. Id. at 913.
241. Id. at 914.
242. Id
243. Id. at 915-16.
244. Diana Marie Wick, The Counter-Productivityof ICSID Denunciationand Proposalsfor
Change, 11 J. INT'L BUS. & L. 239, 287-88 (2012).
245. Moul, supra note 239, at 912 ("In April 2006, ICSID made some limited changes to its
arbitration rules. These amendments demonstrate that it is possible for ICSID to make the necessary
adjustments to meet the evolving needs of investors and host countries. While these changes were a

step in the right direction, there have not been any additional changes to ICSID since 2006.").
246. See Wick, supra note 244, at 287-88.
247. See Bronckers, supra note 236, at 655-56.
248. See id. at 669, 671.
249.
See Matthew C. Porterfield, Exhaustion of Local Remedies in Investor-State Dispute
Settlement: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 41 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 2-9 (2015).
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rule" would require a foreign investor to exhaust all domestic remedies of
the host state before it would have access to Investor-State arbitration.25 0
The proposal suggests that the "[i]ncorporation of the local remedies
rule ... could significantly reduce opposition to ISDS. Rather than
functioning essentially as courts of first instance for investment disputes,
investment tribunals would provide an additional layer of protection that
would be available to foreign investors to address any deficiencies in
domestic legal systems." 2 51 Again, this could very well accompany the
proposal made in this note. However, it will not take the position for the
complete shift to domestic courts.
E. Civil Society Groups Should Have a GreaterRight ofAction
One solution that has been proposed would be to grant certain civil
society groups, such as labor unions, a greater right of action against
foreign investors, as opposed to their current avenues against foreign
governments.2 52 This solution would account for many of the problems
discussed. However, the proposal is ambitious and may require more
political maneuvering than the proposal this note makes. This note takes
the position that these civil society groups should not be raised to the
standing of investors, but rather the investors' standing should be lowered
to that of the civil society groups.
V. LOWERING THE ARBITRAL HURDLE

This note will not seek to provide a mechanism in which
international labor standards are more enforceable. Rather, it seeks to
lessen a potential and notable hurdle in the international community's
long struggle for maintaining high labor standards in international trade
agreements. The proposed solution has two components, each of which,
may be implemented to a varying degree. First, claims against a state by
a foreign investor on the grounds of labor or employment should undergo
an approval process by the foreign state's respective labor department or
ministry. Second, future trade negotiations should push for the inclusion
of a more specific public interest exception for investor-state disputes
arising out of labor. This note recognizes that the process may also be
improved and revised along with other creative methods that have been

250.
251.
252.

See id at 5-8.
See id. at 12.
Tucker, supranote 185, at 14.
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proposed.253 This note also recognizes the usefulness of the ISDS in other
forms of disputes.254 However, the content of investment treaties should
be changed, rather than the ICSID itself.25 5
A. Claims Against a State by a Foreign Investor on the Grounds of
Labor Standards Should Undergo State Approval Process

&

Requiring investors to garner approval from an appropriate host
governing body serves several purposes. First, it better ensures that a
partnering state to an ITA is committed to the goal of international labor
standards. As discussed in Part I of this note, the United States as well as
many industrialized states, have shown continuous commitment to
international labor standards.25 6 A state may not tout a commitment to
those standards with their partnering states and then permit its private
entities investing in a foreign state to bring suit against it for better
fulfilling their commitment to the agreed upon standards. Second, a
foreign state will feel free to raise the standards of their workers without
the fear of facing a suit in international arbitration. The Veolia case
provides one of the first examples of the potential adverse effects the
international arbitration of state action on labor could have. 2 5 7
Currently, for a party in the United States to bring a claim against a
foreign state for inadequate labor standards, the complaint must first go
through the Department of Labor ("DOL")'s submission process. 2 58 As
the DOL describes it, "[1]abor provisions in free trade agreements
establish official processes for receiving complaints ("submissions") from
interested organizations that believe a trading partner is not fulfilling the
labor commitments it made." 2 59 The Bureau of International Labor
Affairs ("ILAB"), an entity that exists within the DOL's Monitoring

253. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based,
Investor-StateDisputeResolution, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 138, 162 (2007) (proposing the utilization
of alternative methods of dispute resolution for investor-state disputes); see also Anthea Roberts,
State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration:A Hybrid Theory ofInterdependent Rights andShared
InterpretiveAuthority, 55 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 61 (2014).
254. See Doak Bishop, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Under the TransatlanticTrade and
Investment Partnership:Have the NegotiationsRun Aground?, 30 ICSID REv. 1 (2014).

255.

Wick, supra note 244 at 287-88; see Moul, supra note 239, at 911-12.

256.
257.
258.

See supraPart I.A.
See supranote 12 and accompanying text.
Submissions under the Labor Provisions of Free Trade Agreements, BUREAU OF INT'L

LAB. AFF., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/our-work/trade/fta-submissions (last visited Apr. 19
2018) [hereinafter Submissions underLabor Provisions].

259.

Id.
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2 60
Enforcement of Trade Agreements Division, conducts this process.
More specifically, the ILAB's Office of Trade and Labor Affairs
("OTLA") is in charge of receiving and reviewing submission made under
labor chapters of U.S. trade agreements. 2 6 1 The OTLA requires a party's
submission to meet certain sets of criteria.2 62 Once the criteria is met, the
OTLA will then accept the submission for review.2 63 In reviewing the
allegations of a submission, the OTLA's process often includes "asking
the other country's government questions about the submission, labor
laws, and labor inspection procedures, as well as visiting the country to
interview workers, managers, and government officials."2 64 The OTLA
then issues a public report, "generally within six months of accepting the
submission. 265 The outcome of the review then determines if any further
action is taken by the OTLA.2 66 This may include the request of
consultations by the United States with the country in question.26 7 Only
after this process has taken place and consultations have failed to resolve
the issues in question may the United States begin FTA dispute settlement
procedures. 2 6 8 And that procedure will still depend upon certain
circumstances.2 69

1. The Approval Process Adopted by a State May Vary Depending
Upon a State'sNeeds and/orCapabilities
The United States may use a process similar to that of the NAALC
side agreement. 2 70 The process is used to screen and approve possible
claims against foreign states for their failure to maintain labor
standards. 2 7 1 The NAALC established the National Administrative Office
("NAO"), serving as a "point of contact with governmental agencies of
that Party, 272 While the proposed solution is modeled from the DOL's
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id

264.

Laws

&

Regulations,

BUREAU

OF

INT'L

LAB.

AFF.,

https://www.dol.gov/ilab/about/laws/#fta. (last visited Feb. 12, 2017).
265.

Submissions under the Labor Provisions,supra note 258.

266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. ("The procedures and remedies vary depending on the particular FTA, and the NAALC
limits which labor issues can be taken to dispute settlement.").
270. NAFTA Side Agreement, supra note 113.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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approval process, a partnering state may choose an approval process that
best fits its needs. The type of specific language that will be discussed in
part 2 of this solution may not be needed in a host state approval clause
within a FTA Investment Chapter, but there may be sound arguments for
specific provisions concerning individual partnering states or for a
uniform requirement. This note will not argue for either, because the
value of the solution is not in its specificity but rather for the purposes of
accountability and consistency.
2. State Approval Aligns a State's Policy with the Global Initiative of
Higher Labor Standards
In regards to accountability, a state approval process would increase
accountability of a state to its citizens as well as to partnering states. The
TPP was notably criticized for making claims against states accessible to
foreign investors but making claims against states for inadequate labor
standards less accessible.2 73 Lack of transparency is often cited as a major
criticism of the ISDS. 274 Because "[i]nvestor-state disputes are often
conducted in secret, sometimes with the public not even knowing about
their existence,"27 5 widespread critique has focused on important public
policy issues that are hidden from the public.27 6 It is not clear that a state
approval process would necessarily require a public report similar to that
of state-state claims, but one would certainly be preferable. Even in the
absence of a public report, state review and approval of an investor's claim
regarding labor, at least in the United States, would put claims made by
investors and those made by labor unions on a more equal playing field.
Ideally, both types of claims would be placed in the same que. The state
may not be at the steering wheel when it comes to investor claims against
states, but at least it will be directing traffic.
B. Future Trade Negotiations Should Push for the Inclusion of a
Specific Exceptionfor Labor Claims within ISDS Chapterof ITA
Some have argued that while IlAs "are useful tools to increase
economic development, and thus should be promoted," there are several
shortcomings in the manner in which the language in these agreements

273.
274.

See supra Part M.B.
BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER, supra note 151.

275.
276.

Id.
Id.
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are negotiated and ratified.277 A notable shortcoming has been the broad
language selected, which creates many inconsistences in interpretation
among partnering states.2 78 As one author put it,
The problem is that a huge number of treaties were negotiated
in a broad manner, without leaving host states with enough
liberal margins to engage in public matters regulations. This
situation generates unsteadiness with investors' and host states'
rights, and thus calls for the rebalance of the status quo.
Moreover, most of the terms and standards included in many of
the treaties do not contain any guidelines about how to interpret
such terms and standards. As HAs are the applicable law in
treaty-based ISDS, arbitral tribunals have turned to the
interpretation task. By engaging in such interpretation, arbitral
tribunals risk surpassing their legitimate power to settle
disputes, thereby creating inconsistent and conflicting
decisions.2 79
In light of this commentary, future trade agreements should contain
more specific language concerning the commitment to labor standards.
This may be done in both labor and investment chapters in any form of a
trade agreement.
Additionally, this specific language should be used to create a clear
exception for Investor-State disputes involving the increasing of labor
standards. This recommendation is made in light of the public interest
exception that is included in the official draft of the TPP.2 so While the
exception has been touted as a safeguard to a state's ability to make basic
public policy changes,2 81 future negotiations should create a specific
exception for labor improvements. The language should be specific but
not so all encompassing that a state may require luxurious employee
benefits with no recourse for a foreign investor. In other words,
should
"customary international law and the domestic law ...
Margie-Lys Jaime, Relying Upon Parties'Interpretation in Treaty-Based Investor-State
277.
Dispute Settlement: Fillingthe Gaps in InternationalInvestment Agreements, 46 GEO. J. INT'LL. 261,

313 (2014).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280.

Summary of the Trans-PacificPartnershipAgreement, U.S. EMBASSY IN URU. (Oct. 6,

2015), https://uy.usembassy.gov/summary-trans-pacific-partnership-agreementl.
281. Id. ("In establishing investment rules, the TPP Parties set out rules requiring nondiscriminatory investment policies and protections that assure basic rule of law protections, while
protecting the ability of Parties' governments to achieve legitimate public policy objectives.").
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theoretically allow for each country to take regulatory action that is in
good faith." 2 82 The ISDS can play an important and much needed role in
FTAs, but its effect on a state's ability to legislate public policy matters,
such as labor, is an area that deserves continuous scrutiny.283
VI. CONCLUSION

It seems unlikely that Investor-State arbitration will be omitted from
current and future trade agreements. ISDS serves an important purpose
but likewise deserves continuous scrutiny. Rather than making broad
overarching changes to the system, small and incremental alterations
should be made based upon the need of a particular public interest. This
has been the approach taken by this note.
Alex Richman Reinauer*

282. Owen, supranote 200, at 66-67.
283. See id. at 67 ("[O]ngoing discriminatory regulation against foreign investors is an
unfortunate reality. Well-tailored ISDS provisions are an important form of protection and recourse
for foreign investors that have been unfairly treated. Clearly, addressing the claims of private actors
becomes more challenging when this treatment is less overtly unfair and is shrouded in more noble
intentions.").
* Alex Richman Reinauer received his J.D. from the Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra
University in May of 2018. He would like to thank Professor Julian Ku for his insights and guidance
during the process of composing this note.
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